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THE LEGAL BASIS OF MUNICIPAL
AIRPORTS*
ROBERT L. GROVERt
A municipal airport is not a thing entirely apart from all
other municipal enterprises. Its justification as a municipal enter-
prise is analogous to that of other similar projects, and the public
benefit realized from it is not substantially different from that
arising from traction, systems and other utilities often publicly
owned. But there are many problems peculiar to the airport alone.
Its location, its regulation, its part in the general transportation
scheme and its general utility have all raised questions requiring
the re-examination of doctrines of municipal corporation law in
the light of new difficulties.1 The philosophy of regulation itself
is in an unsettled state, due to the rapid growth of the airport
movement, and the paucity of reliable information bearing upon
the wisdom of certain courses of action. The situation calls for
a survey of what has actually been done by courts and legislatures.
The municipal airport is an indispensable link in the air navi-
gation chain.2  Day and night schedules could not be carried on
without the presence of the well-constructed, well-lighted munic-
ipal ports which dot the airways. Municipal contribution in the
form of these facilities has made possible the construction and
maintenance of necessary ports where commercial private ports
could never have survived, and thus contributed largely to the
rapid growth of commercial air navigation.A The municipal ports
have been in the nature of an indirect subsidy to aviation, without
*An individual study made in conjunction with the Aia LAW INSTITUTE.
and with the cooperation of the Illinois Aeronautics Commission.
tMr. Grover is a graduate of Northwestern University School of Law.
1. See MacDonald, Austin F., "Airport Problems of American Cities,"
151 Annals 1 (1930).
2. The airport statistics of the Department of Commerce, 5 Air Comm.
Bull. 206 (Feb. 1, 1934), reveal in part the indispensability of the municipal
facilities. On that date, there were 564 municipal airports and 647 com-
mercial airports. Of these 211 municipal ports had night lighting equipment,
while only 113 commercial ports were so equipped. An inspection of the other
equipment reveals further municipal superiority. The effect of the Aeronautics
Branch-Civil Works Administration airport development program should not
bG overlooked, although it does not properly fall within the scope of this
study. On March 30, 1934, 688 airnort projects, all public, were being carried
on under the Administration supervision.
3. The United States seems to stand alone as regards the number and
quality of its municipal airports. Local public airports have been urged in
England without success. See Wingfleld, Lawrence A., "Memorandum on Im-
proved Facilities for Airports and Airport Proprietors in England," 4 Air
L. Rev. 278 (1933).
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which the development of the industry would have been long
retarded.'
Unless hampered by adverse legislation or judicial rulings, the
municipal airport promises to play even a larger part in air
navigation in the future than in the past. Municipalities are on the
whole in a better position to construct conveniently located air-
ports, adequately financed and serviced at the outset, than are
private companies. The power of eminent domain makes property
available to government which private capital might never reach,
and the resources of public credit, coupled with taxation, surpass
by far those of private operators.
I. AUTHORITY TO ACQUIRE AND MAINTAIN MUNICIPAL AIRPORTS.
The Doctrine of "Public Purpose":
The primary obstacle to municipal participation in a new en-
terprise, particularly one of a semi-commercial nature, is found in
the doctrine of "public purpose." The question arises principally
in two ways: (1) in an action to enjoin construction, upon the
ground of lack of public or municipal purposes, and (2) in an
action to enjoin expenditure of funds, upon the grounds of appro-
priation of public credit for private use, a practice forbidden by
practically all state constitutions..
In many states there is statutory declaration that municipal air-
ports are for a public purpose. 5 Such a declaration is neither es-
sential nor conclusive, but it does fortify the argument of public
need, an essential element in public purpose. The distinction be-
tween "public purpose" and "municipal purpose," once frequently
utilized to defeat municipal participation in new proprietary activi-
ties, has seemingly lost its validity. At least in the airport field it
presents no objection that cannot be met by a finding of public
purpose.8
Judicial decisions are unanimous in their holding that a munic-
ipal airport project is endowed with a public purpose, although the
means by which courts have arrived at this conclusion vary widely.
In cases w:here city charter provisions seem to require, the air-
port is thrown into the category of a public utility,7 which carries
4. Supra. note 1. For statistics showing the poor financial return from
such airports, see 28 Aviation 584 (1930).
5. Arizona Laws of 1929, Ch. 38; Minnesota Laws of 1929, Ch. 127;
Iowa Laws of 1929, Ch. 138.
6. See Dysart V. City of St. Louis. infra, note 9; City of Ardmore v.
Excise Board of Carter County, infro, note 9, held the airport to be a "purely
municipal" function.
7. State ex rel. City of Lincoln v. Johnson, 117 Neb. 301, 220 N. W. 273
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public purpose with it. Where the court deems it necessary to
satisfy the requirements of a park statute under which an airport is
projected, public purpose is found in amusement and recreation
incident to a landing field.8  Where general municipal enabling
statutes or general grants of municipal power are concerned,9
courts say that an obvious express or implied legislative intent to
keep abreast of the times will support the extension of the "public
purpose" classification to a municipal airport. Nor will the com-
bination of an airport with other municipal projects defeat the
application of the label "public purpose" to the airport.1"
Regardless of the form in which the question has been pre-
sented, the motivating factor in the result has been uniform. Mr.
Justice Cardozo phrased it succinctly in Hesse v. Rath:"-
Aviation is today an established method of transportation. The future,
even the near future, will make it still more general. The city that is
without the foresight to build the ports for the new traffic may soon be
left behind in the race of competition. Chalcedon was called the city of
the blind, because its founders rejected the nobler site of Byzantium lying
at their feet. The need for vision of the future in the governance of cities
has not lessened with the years. The dwellers within the gates, even more
than the stranger from afar, will pay the price of blindness.
Argument on the other side of the question has been based
upon the narrow limitation upon benefit derived by the general
public from an airport. Such objection is exemplified by the
(1928). In that case the statute was held to allow bond issues after a refer-
endum as for other public utilities. Cities were empowered to bond for public
utilities, so the airport was declared a public utility. Similar cases are:
State ex rel. Chandler v. Jackson. 121 Ohio St. 186, 167 N. E. 896 (1930), and
State ex rel. Hile v. City of Cleveland, 26 Ohio App. 158, 160 N. E. 241 (1927).
8. City of Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kans. 500, 263 P. 12 (1928), noted in 12
Minn. L. Rev. 549 (1928), and 16 I. of Pa. L. Rev. 1004 (1928); Ruth V.
Oklahoma City, 143 Okla. 66, 287 P. 406 (1930); Schmoldt V. City of Okla-
homa City, 144 Okla. 208, 291 P. 119 (1930), noted in 1 Air L. Rev. 481,
(1930), and 12 Va. L. Rev. 165 (1930). In the last case the court finds
a park purpose In the following words: "The public would enjoy an air-
plane exhibition, to see an airplane glide gently to the earth and take to the
air again as gracefully as an eagle in its flight, and ponder on the wonderful
accomplishments of the airplane."
9. Reinhart v. MacGuffle, Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, Luzerne County, de-
cided May 12, 1933, noted in 5 JOURNAL Or AIR LAW 150 (1934) ; Armstrong V.
Wayne County Board of Auditors, C. C. of Wayne County, Mich., No. 205,086,
decided August 29. 1933; McClintock v. City of Roseburg, 127 Ore. 698, 273 P.
331 (1931) ;State ex rel. Chandler v. Jackson, supra. note 7 ; State ex rel. Lin-
coln v. Johnson, supra note 7; State cx rel. City of Walla Walla v. Clausseon.
infra, note 47: City of Spokane v. Williams, infra, note 47: Wentz v. City of
Philadelphia, 301 Pa. 261, 151 A. 883 (1930), noted in 20 Nat'l. Mun. Rev. 44
(1931) ; State Airport Commission V. May. 5 R. I. 110, 152 A. 225 (1930);
Hesse v. Rath. 294 N. Y. 436, 164 N. E. 342 (1928), noted in 15 Va. L.
Rev. 491 (1929) In re Airport of City of Utica, 234 N. Y. S. 668 (1929);
Dysart v. City of St. Touis, 321 Mo 514, 11 S. W. (2d) 1045 (1928),
noted in 14 St. Louis L. Rev. 441 (1929) : Ennis v. Kansas City, 321 Mo. 536,
11 S. W. (2d) 1054 (1928) ; City of Ardmore v. Excise Bd. of Carter County.
155 Okla. 126, 8 P. (2d) 2 (1928) ; City of Wichita v. Clapp, supra, note 8:
Douty v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 155 Md. 125, 141 A. 499 (1928).
10. Wentz v. Philadelphia, supra note 9.
11. Supra. note 9.
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brief of counsel 12 in Dysart v. St. Louis,18 quoted by the court.
The answer to that argument is bottomed on the principle
that "public purpose" does not require a personal direct benefit
to each citizen of the community. The standard in de-
termining the presence or absence of "public purpose" is very
flexible; the determination of the degree of public benefit neces-
sary to endow a municipal project with "public purpose"
lies to a great extent with the municipality itself. 14  Such a
result is proper, since the factors which determine public benefit
are often peculiarly local, and decision upon them should be left
to those best acquainted with them, the local municipal authorities
and the people. In McClintock v. City of Roseburg,5 the court
went further, and judicially recognized the present limited scope
of the benefit, holding that the community and the legislature might
anticipate a broadened future benefit.
That municipal airports are endowed with a public purpose,
even in the absence of statutory declaration, seems now impregnably
established.
From Whence the Power Flows:
There is but little uniformity in the means by which the power
to acquire and maintain municipal airports has been established and
extended by statute. The mechanics and completeness of treat-
ment have in large part depended upon the degree of interest mani-
fested in the development of air travel by the state, and the thor-
oughness with which the legislation has been prepared.
Enabling legislation may be cast into three general categories :",
(1) That of the type which merely adds another brief power to an
extended list of powers granted to municipalities. Typical of this
12. "It (the airport) will afford a starting and landing place for a few
wealthy ultra-reckless persons, who own planes and are engaged in privatepleasure flying. . . . It will afford a starting and landing place for pleasure
tourists from other cities, alighting in St. Louis. while flitting her: and yon.It will offer a passenger station for the very few persons who are able to
afford, and who desire to experience, the thrill of a novel and expensive mode
of luxurious transportation . ..
"In the very nature of things, the vast majority of the inhabitants of
the city, a 99 per cent majority, cannot now and never can, reap any benefitfrom the existence of an airport. .
"True it may be permitted to the ordinary common garden variety of
citizen to enter the airport free of charge, so that he may press his face against
some restricting barrier, and sujpburn his throat, gazing at his more fortunate
compatriots as they sportingly navigate the empyrean blue.
"But beyond that, beyond the right to look hungrily on, the ordinary
citizen gets no benefit from the taxes he is forced to pay."
13. Supra, note 9.
14. MacGufse v. Reinhart, supra, note 9.15. Supra, note 9.
16. Tabulation of the various state statutes is fruitless because of the
rapid changes taking place. Conseouently, only examples will be given in
each class.
THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
class was the Illinois statute 7 before the passage of the recent
Municipal Airport Act."8 (2) Amendments to city charters already
granted, specifically altering the instrument. In states which have
inaugurated city home rule, or granted specific city charters,
many legislatures deemed it sufficient to add the power to the
enumerated list of those which may be exercised by these cities,
in order to avoid the ever present objection that it was not a true
city project.1 9  (3) A well-considered independent airport statute,
prepared by experts, and designed to meet all exigencies. Typical
of this legislation is the proposed Uniform Airports Act,20 a meas-
ure calculated to obviate piece-meal legislative remedies, and avoid
the delays and litigation which always attend procedure under an
ambiguous and crudely framed statute.
There seems to be a definite tendency toward a standardized
treatment of the airport problem. Illinois has but recently swept
away the relics of early endeavor and placed upon its statute books
an act 2' fully as comprehensive as the proposed Uniform Airports
Act. Other states, progressing with equal delay, have remedied
early shortcomings and arrived at nearly the same goal by different
routes.
22
In Whom the Power Is Vested:
A consideration of the various governmental units through
which airport construction and management is empowered to be
carried on reveals a startling contrariety of opinion as to the
proper media of airport development.
(1) In practically all states at present, cities and villages in
general are empowered to construct and maintain airports. Com-
mencing soon after the war, when limited classes of large cities
ventured into the airport field, and secured enabling legislation, in
some cases over considerable objection, there has been a steady
movement toward the extension of the privilege to all cities and
17. Illinois Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1933), Sec. 65-99.
18. Illinois 58th Gen. Assembly, 3rd sp. session, House Bill No. 85 (1934).
The bill as Introduced is reproduced in 5 JOURNAL o AIR LAW 301 (1934).
The act as passed omitted an important section relative to zoning. In its
amended form the act was approved March 28. 1934. See 234 C. C. H. 3086.
19. Laws of South Carolina, 1929. Acts 562, 538, 461, 440.
20. See 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 555 (1931) for text. This uniform act has
been sponsored by the American Bar Association Committee on Aeronautical
Law. At a Jbint meeting of the Bar Association Committee and the Aviation
Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, held at Washington, D. C., on May 10, 1934, it was decided to submit
the draft in its present or amended form at the Milwaukee meeting of the
American Bar Association, in August. 1924. See also Indiana Acts of 1920,
section 3838 and ff.
21. Supra. note 18.
22. Georgia Laws of 1933, Act. 207.
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villages, in general terms. The change in sentiment went hand in
hand with the rapid development of commercial air navigation,
which emphasized the possibilities of benefit, present and future,
that might be derived by a municipality on a main lane of air
travel.
(2) Counties are now generally extended the same power.
The wisdom of this seemingly unnecessary and duplicatory dele-
gation is illustrated in those states which have large areas of
sparse population, and few cities large enough to venture into
airport development unaided. However, the benefit which a county
might derive from an airport would seem considerably more re-
mote than that flowing to a city.
(3) While not properly within the scope of this survey, it is
essential to mention that in a few instances states have reserved
and delegated to their administrative departments some power of
airport development. 2 Apparently the basis of the policy is the
desire to reserve sufficient power to locate necessary airports in
areas where local enthusiasm has been insufficient to stimulate
development.
(4) In a few jurisdictions the organization of special airport
districts, as separate municipal corporations, with independent
administration and powers of tax levy and bond sale, has been
provided in, detail. 24 The necessity of such additional governmental
complexities is questionable. Municipalities already organized and
functioning can singly or collectively administer an airport project
without undue strain. Nor is it necessary to the establishment
and financing of an airport to embrace in the taxing area far-flung
expanses of territory, or tracts of land not already annexed to a
municipality, as do special levee and sanitary canal districts. If
the attempted exercise of this statutory device would have any
effect, it would be the discouragement of airport development, by
the creation of a psychological obstacle in the path of public par-
ticipation in the enterprise-the creation of additional govern-
mental machinery.
(5) Peculiar circumstances have in a few situations led to
the delegation of power to port and harbor districts.25 While such
a situation would rarely arise, it must be said that the colorful
analogy frequently referred to by courts, that between harbors
of the sea and harbors of the air, falls with the utterance. There
23. Laws of Kentucky, 1926, Ch. 107; Rhode Island Laws of 1929, Ch.1363.24. California Statutes of 1929, Ch. 487.
25. Wisconsin Laws of 1931, Ch. 74.
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is an equally striking practical dissimilarity in operation, and the
two functions should not be combined in the hands of the same
authority.
(6) The last substantial group of municipal organisms fre-
quently endowed with the power of acquisition and operation of
airport facilities is park districts .2  The choice of park districts
as repositories of supervisory power over airport development
seems to be based upon a misconception of airport purposes. The
lodgment of the power as above described has been supported by
the courts, largely upon the reasoning that the maintenance of an
airplane landing field is a park purpose because it furnishes
amusement and recreation to the park visitors. Amusement and
recreation should not be the functions of a municipal airport.
While convenience to private flyers is a factor never to be over-
looked, the airport is a quasi-commercial enterprise, and should
be so regarded and conducted.
2 7
(7) Legislation frequently extends the power to joint opera-
tion of airports by cities, cities and county, and in some instances
by counties. Joint operation is a useful device to spread the
expense of maintenance. It might be said that the public benefit
also is spread wide and woefully thin. But as has previously been
pointed out, once general public benefit has been found, individual
participation or lack of it furnishes no argument to defeat public
participation in the project.
How the Power Is Exercised:
The initiation of an airport development in a community is
the point at which much delay has occurred. Unguided local en-
thusiasm, failing of direction in the enabling statutes which all too
frequently have omitted the mention of directing authority in
specifying the skeleton of procedure, has come to naught through
sheer lack of channels of procedure.
Practically all state statutes now contemplate action by the
municipal legislative body as the initiatory step. County super-
visors, port and park commissioners, stand in the same position.
While this is the ordinary provision, it commonly results in making
an airport proposal a political football, as municipal utilities have
26. This is a, very common provision. See, for example, Illinois Laws of
1929, p. 557.
27. Sentiment on this point is divided. Mr. MacDonald makes a strong
argument in favor of park control and maintenance: MacDonald, supra, note 1.
See Sheriff, Fred B., "Airport management," Proceedings of the First Regional
Meeting, North Central Section, National Association of State Aviation Officials,
p. 49 (1933).
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been, or throwing it into the great mass of suggestions which fail
of completion through lack of surface appeal to the ordinary lay-
man, or political glamour.
In California, 2 provision has been made for the creation of
special airport districts by petition and ballot, and the election of
airport commissioners whose sole function is the development and
management of the airport, the levy of taxes throughout the dis-
trict, and the general promotion of local aviation. This method
of procedure has the advantage of providing a body specialized in
function and undisturbed by extraneous political problems. But
the obstacle presented, which has prevented a wide use of the
device, is the apathy or active opposition of the general mass of
citizens toward a proposal which involves the levy of additional
tax burdens, and the creation of additional governmental
machinery.
Indiana, 29 with characteristic faith in the judgment of the
electorate and its representatives, has adopted the customary
method of initiation, that of endowing the local governing body
of the municipality the power of initiation, but in addition it
allows a referendum on the whole proposal, upon a petition re-
questing ballot, signed by five per cent of the voters of the district.
It also requires in specific terms the filing of the plans and esti-
mates for public perusal before final action is taken by the muni-
cipality.
Kentucky"0 has adopted a semi-separate set-up which is very
appealing; a separate impartial county air board is created in
each county, the board to be created of men selected by the local
officials, and to be composed of members qualified for their offices.
With them rests the discretion of initiating local development
measures, and following them through to completion. This board
may levy taxes through the county machinery, bond or borrow in
anticipation of its revenue, and do all other acts which the ordinary
statute authorizes the municipality to do. These powers may be
exercised alone or in cooperation with any municipality in the
county. The Kentucky scheme has much to recommend it. It
offers unified control, advantageous placement and distribution of
airport developments, and widespread tax levies. It also makes
possible a stability of personnel and continuity of policy which are
impossible in independent local bodies. Kentucky also allows the
28. Supra. note 24.
29. Indiana Acts of 1920, Sec. 3838 and ff.
30. Kentucky Laws of 1926, Ch. 107.-
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specially created State Air Board to provide airports where neces-
sary, presumably where county boards will not cooperate with the
state-wide plan. Considering these two approaches together with
the further delegation of power to park commissioners of first class
cities to establish airports, it must be conceded that Kentucky prob-
ably has one of the most comprehensive governmental plans for
airport development found in the United States.
In Rhode Island, 1 the State Airport Commission is vested
with complete power to acquire and maintain airports, and finance
them out of special state airport bond issues. The justification for
the vesting of exclusive power in a state commission is found in
the geographical characteristics of the state. In a larger state such
a plan would be of far less utility, because of the magnitude of
the financial obligation, and the diversity of problems presented
by varying local conditions.
South Carolina 2 has found it necessary to alter by statute the
charters of several of the large cities to allow their governing
bodies, or special airport commissioner created within them, to
exercise the power. Other states have followed this same method
of procedure where the city charters called for it; some states have
in general terms given the grant of power, with the expectation
that courts would hold city charters, especially those of the home
rule group, to be construed liberally by legislative expression.
While these illustrations present a general survey of the means
ordinarily used to initiate local airport development, it must not be
forgotten that state constitutions and general revenue statutes fre-
quently call for a referendum upon an increase in the tax levy
for a new project, and for a bond issue. Thus even where the
power of acquisition and maintenance seems to rest in the local
governing body without referendum, the electorate retains indirect
control by its power to throttle necessary financial measures.
II. ACQUISITION.
Means of Acquisition:
The desirability of an all-inclusive grant of acquisitory power
is obvious. The model pronouncement is found in the Uniform
Airports Act, section 1:88
Municipalities, counties, and other political subdivisions of this state are
hereby authorized, separately or jointly, to acquire, establish, construct, own,
31. Rhode Island Laws of 1929. Ch. 1353.
32. Supra, note 19.
33. See 3 JOURNAL OF AIa LAW 645 (1932), for the text of the Act.
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lease, control, equip, improve, maintain, operate, regulate, and police air-
ports and landing fields for the use of aircraft. .
Statutory draftsmanship differs widely throughout the states, but
in general all the power which might be inferred from the above
selection are granted. Of course, municipalities being strictly lim-
ited in their activities by legislative mandate, are dependent upon
specifically granted or necessarily implied powers.
(1) Without the power of purchase, there could be no de-
velopment whatsoever. It is a power unanimously granted, but
sometimes hedged about with express and implied restrictions.
For example, it has been required that before final action be taken,
an option must be secured on the land proposed to be used, notice
and details posted, and an opportunity afforded for public hearing
and discussion of the details of the proposal.3' Then, of course,
the necessity of referendum of bond issues and tax levies, pre-
viously referred to, places another restriction upon the untram-
melled exercise of the power.
(2) The lease of private lands for airport purposes is fre-
quently attended by considerable restriction. Power to acquire by
lease is not implied in a general grant of power to "acquire", and
must be specifically mentioned in the statute. 5 General statutes
frequently limit the power of a municipality to acquire by lease,
requiring public notice, opportunity for a hearing, limiting the
period which the lease may run, and the covenants which may be
contained in it. Airport legislation must be read in the light of
the general restrictions placed upon the exercise of municipal
powers otherwise granted.
(3) Acquisition through gift and dedication is universally
acknowledged to be implicit in the power to acquire, although not
expressed. However, the purposes of the dedication must be con-
formed with reasonably, or it fails altogether, and the donor may
reenter.
(4) Land acquired by any means for purposes other than an
airport can ordinarily be used for an airport, unless voluntary
conveyances forbid. 6 When the public authority owns the entire
title to land it may be given by law the power to use the land
devoted to one public purpose for another. 7 Under some condem-
nation laws the local government takes a fee, bringing it under the
above-stated rule, but under others only an easement passes for
34. Indiana Acts of 1920, Sec. 3838 and ff.
35. Opinion of the Atty. Gen'l. of Ohio, Sept. 1, 1928.
36. Hubbard. McClintock and Williams, op. cit. infra, note 54, at p. 120.
37. Ibid.
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the purposes specified. While courts are stricter in analyzing
the use in the latter case, even there statutes may indirectly or
impliedly authorize an alteration of purpose, in the interest of the
development of a valid public project. Statutory authorization for
a park district to maintain an airport impliedly authorizes land
taken and held for park purposes to be used for an airport.
(5) The exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
the basis of most of the litigation in this branch of the law. The
variegated pattern of state legislation on the point has given rise
to much confusion. As a result of the failure of legislatures to
meet the difficulty, airport development in some jurisdictions has
moved forward with halting step, and by indirection the interest
of the public in air navigation has been retarded. The question
resolves itself into one inquiry: what nicety of specification is
required of a statute to support the delegation of the power of
eminent domain to a municipality?
It is a foundation principle that the power of eminent domain
rests in the sovereign, subject only to the conditions that the pur--
pose for which private property be taken is public, and that just
compensation be made. 8 The sovereign may delegate the power,
but the delegation must be express or clearly implied, and all in-
tendments are in favor of the property owner.3 Doubtful ex-
pressions will be interpreted to negative the grant.40  Although
these rules were long applied with unyielding exactitude, modern
decisions have introduced some refinements into their interpreta-
tion. The doctrine of "necessary implication" has been utilized to
extend the power of eminent domain to acts necessary to the com-
plete exercise of acts whose partial execution was already coupled
with the power.4 1 But this supplementation has been sparingly
used, and courts have rigidly limited its application. The boundary
of interpretation which courts rarely transgress was well expressed
in City of Los Angeles v. Koyer,4 2 where it was said that the
power of eminent domain would never pass by implication, but its
exercise might be measured by expression or clear limitation.
Another relaxation of the older rigid rule is found in such cases
as Helm v. Grayville,43 where the court looked to a general con-
demnation statute to support the exercise of the power in pursu-
38. Foltz v. St. Louis & S. F. Railway Co., 60 V. 316 (1894).
39. Devon v. County Board of Education, 210 Ala. 256, 97 S. 741 (1923)
Gillespie v. Aurora Railway Co., 228 Ill. 261, 81 N. E. 1005 (1907).
40. Comiskey v. City of Lynn. 226 Mass. 210, 145 N E. 312 (1917).
41. City of Los Angeles v. Koyer, 48 Cal. App. 720, 192 P. 301 (1920),
26 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1130.
42. Ibid.
43. 224 111. 274, 79 N. E. 689 (1906).
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ance of a specially, extended right. However, in all of these
holdings, it is pointed out that the result does not represent an
abandonment of the hallowed principle of "jealous guardianship"
which has long dictated the interpretation of statutes delegating
the power of eminent domain.
The pertinency of these principles to the airport situation is
illustrated by their application to statutes similar to the recently
supplanted Illinois statute, 44 which gave power to "acquire and
maintain" for landing fields. While at first glance such a provision
would seem to give power to acquire in any manner that seemed
convenient, such is not the case. The Attorney-General has ad-
vised that these terms do not carry with them the right to acquire
by eminent domain.4 5 Indeed, "acquire" standing alone has been
expressly held not to carry with it the power of eminent domain.40
Thus, in the absence of a general grant, elsewhere in the statutes,
to acquire land for public purpose by eminent domain, municipal
airport projects may be blocked by the exorbitant demands of
landowners.
If the statutes contain a general grant of power to acquire
land by eminent domain for public purposes, and a specific authori-
zation to engage in municipal airport development, courts will con-
strue the statutes together to authorize the exercise of the general
power for the specific project, under the doctrine of "necessary
implication. '4
7
Where. Land May Be Acquired:
In a majority of the states, legislatures have now extended
general power of acquisition with its attendant means to munici-
palities to be used within or without the corporate limits. It is in
the states which have not so provided that the attempted exercise
of the power of extraterritorial acquisition has been attended with
grave difficulty. In many cases the power of extraterritorial ac-
quisition has been granted to limited classes of cities, or limited
in distance. In view of the frequent necessity of establishing
an airport beyond corporate limits, both from financial and geo-
graphical causes, it is seen that the problem presents serious ob-
44. Ill. Rev. Stat. (Cahill, 1933), Ch. 24, Sec. 65.99.
45. Opinion of the Atty. Gen'l., Nov. 17, 1933.
46. Allegan v. losco Land Co, 254 Mich. 560, 236 N. W. 863 (1931).
47. City of Spokane v. Williams. et al. 157 Wash. 120, 229 P. 256 (1930)
State ex rtel. City of Walla Walla V. Claussen, 157 Wash. 457, 289 P. 61 (1930).
Power to close a highway was assumed without express delegation in Clayton
& Lambert Mfg. Co. v. City of Detroit. 34 F. (2d) 303 (1929).
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stacles in those states where legislative expression has not been
clear and unequivocal. 4
A rule long adhered to in the intraterritorial limitation of
corporate powers is expressed in Langley v. Georgia,4 in the fol
lowing terms:
A municipal corporation being a governmental institution, designed to
create a local government over a limited territory, the general rule is that
such a corporation cannot purchase and hold real estate beyond its territorial
limits, unless the power to do so is expressly given by the legislature.
This doctrine finds expression in an older case50 in much the same
phraseology: the power to acquire real estate extraterritorially is
not conferred by a power "to purchase, hold, and convey any
estate, real or personal, for the public use of said corporation,"
and a conveyance of such land to a city having the beforementioned
power only is void.
The rule enunciated for extraterritorial acquisition by eminent
domain without specific legislative authority is even more strictly
construed, 51 and the older cases went to great lengths in their
requirements of extreme clarity and unequivocalness of expression
in granting the power. 2
There seems to be no dispute that the legislature may authorize
extra-corporate exercise of eminent domain, with the customary
constitutional limits, and within the limits of the state 83  The
difficulty presented in all the cases is: When has the power been
granted?
As to the unexpressed power to purchase extraterritorial
realty, vigorous dissent from the old rule has of late been expressed
by outstanding authors,54 whose opinions have been borne out by
courts which have strayed from the stereotyped expressions. Thus
it has been said that in the absence of an express prohibition, a.
municipal corporation may purchase and hold real estate outside its
corporate limits for legitimate municipal purposes.8 8 McQuillan
considers that the rule so enunciated is "supported by the weight of
authority as well as by the better reasoning, especially whiere the city
48. Note, 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 94 (1931).
49. 118 Ga. 590, 45 S. E. 486 (1903).
50. Riley v. Rochester. 9 N. Y. 64 (1853).
51. Leeds v. City of Richmond, 102 Ind. 372, 1 N. E. 711 (1885).
52. See 42 L. R. A. (N. s.) 137.
53. Dillon. Municipal Corporations (5th Ed., 1911), Sec. 1028.
54. McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (2d Ed., 1928), Sec. 1210; Hubbard,
McClintock and Williams. Airports (Harvard City Planning Series I, 1930),
p. 119.
55. Smith v. City of Kuttawa. 22 Ky. 569. 1 S. W. (2d) 979 (1928)
Schneider v Menasha, 118 Wis. 298, 95 N. W. 94 (1903). This rule applies
nnly to instances where purchase is the mode of acquisition: Lewis. Eminent
Domain, Sec. 372.
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has a broad charter provision, such as one conferring power to pur-
chase and hold real estate sufficient for the public use, convenience,
or necessities." 56 Municipalities have power to do those things which
are necessary to or fairly implied in or incident to powers ex-
pressly granted. Thus if it becomes necessary to acquire land
outside the city limits in order effectively to exercise a power ex-
pressly granted, the power to acquire such lands will be implied.2'
Nor has this flexible implication doctrine been limited alone to
those extra-corporate lands which are deemed necessary; some
courts have held that it will be utilized where the land would be
desirable from the viewpoint of health and sanitation.58  This is
not, however, a substantial departure from the necessity doctrine.
Can the application of these doctrines to municipal power to
acquire and maintain all airport support an extra-corporate acqui-
sition by purchase or gift? The line of cases supporting the doctrine
of necessity are those dealing with sewers, pest-houses, and ceme-
teries, and proceed largely upon the basis of protecting the health
and safety of local inhabitants. While it may be urged that danger
would result if an airport were located in close proximity to thickly
populated areas, a stronger argument might be based upon the
noise, dust, and crowds incident to airport operation. These factors
arise more directly in the cases in which airports have been at-
tacked as nuisances.
A few cases, of which Hafner v. City of St. Louis9 is an
example, have extended the power of extraterritorial purchase
without express statutory authorization to a point at which the
ruling is extremely apposite to an airport situation. In that case
the city of St. Louis was given power to purchase and hold such
real estate as might be required by the purposes of the corporation,
and also the power to purchase and hold property outside the city
limits for certain enumerated purposes. It was held that the city
had power to purchase extra-corporate realty for a purpose not
enumerated in the charter, since the purpose sought to be achieved
was a proper public one, and one which often required land outside
the corporate limits for its exercise. Unfortunately, the liberality
shown by the court in the construction of the charter provisions
is not frequently found, the majority of courts drawing the line of
56. McQuillan, op. cit. supra. note 54, See. 1210.
67. Melville v. City of San Diego, 183 Cal. 734, 192 P. 702 (1920) ; Leeds
v. City of Richmond. 102 Ind. 372 (1885) ; Dillon, op. cit. supra note 53, See.
1028; McQuillan, op. cit. supra, note 54, Sec. 1580.
58. City of Champaign v. Harmon, 98 Ill. 491 (1881) : Coldwater v.
Tucker. 36 Mich. 474 (1877) ; Cochran v. Park Ridge, 138 Ill. 295 (1891)
see also Dillon, op. cit. supra, note 53, Sec. 980.
59. 161 Mo. 34. 61 S. W. 632 (1900).
THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
implication at such cases as the sewer, cemetery and pest-house
cases.
Courts have been far less ready to imply the power of eminent
domain outside the corporate limits. The general rule seems to be
that even if power to condemn within the corporate limits for a
special purpose is granted specifically, power to condemn outside
the corporate limits for the same purpose is lacking.60 Nor if
power is granted to purchase, or own land for a specific purpose
outside the city limits, will the courts imply a power of condemna-
tion for the more complete exercise of the specific purpose.01 But,
as Professor Zollmann, a recognized writer on the subject, has
pointed out, the courts have not been completely fettered by these
well-defined historical limitations.6 2 He says, after reviewing some
recent airport decisions:
The fact that in all of these cases the power of the city to do what
it proposed to do was sustained is significant. The necessity of an air-
port, if a city is not hopelessly to fall in the rear of the progress of the
world, is so patent that courts apparently will deny it such powers only if
the legal limitations are such that the courts are unable to find an avenue
of escape from them.
Two Washington cases illustrate well the line of approach
which courts are adopting to supplement incompletely phrased
municipal powers in the airport field.68 In both these cases the
municipality was given complete power to acquire, by condemnation
or otherwise, maintain, and operate airports, within its city limits,
and such airports were declared to be for a public purpose. By
general statute they were given the power to condemn within and
without corporate limits for corporate purposes. An attempt was
made to defeat condemnation outside the city limits for airport
purposes, and the court ruled that the power so to do had been
granted. It was held that the two statutes, read together, clearly
authorized the exercise of the airport power outside the city, in
conjunction with the power of eminent domain.
In City of Wichita v. Clapp 4 the airport statute authorized
the acquisition of land for an airport, and another statute gave
the city the power to condemn land within five miles of the city
limits for park purposes. The City attempted to condemn land
60. Nichols. Eminent Domain (1917), See. 359.
61. City of Detroit V. Oakland. Circuit Judge, 237 Mich. 446, 212 N. W.
207 (1927).
62. "Airports," 13 Marquetto L. Rev. 97 (1929).
63. City of Spokane v. Williams, et al., supra, note 47; State ex rel. City
of Walla Walla v. Claussen, supra, note 47.
64. Supra, note 9.
THE LEGAL BASIS OF MUNICIPAL AIRPORTS
for a park, most of which was to be used for an aviation field.
The court held that although the airport statute did not confer
the desired power, the park statute might be utilized, since the
creation of an airport came within proper park purposes.
In summation, it may be said: (1) that a municipality simply
empowered to acquire and maintain an airport may acquire land
for that purpose by gift or purchase outside the corporate limits.
Whether it may condemn within the city is doubtful; it is certain
that eminent domain may not be exercised without the limits;
(2) that a city authorized to condemn within its limits for an
airport, and vested with power, to pursue corporate purposes out-
side the limits may by implication be allowed to exercise the power
outside the city, although such a combination is far less persuasive
than an authorization to acquire an airport within the city, coupled
with a statute extending the power of condemnation within and
without the city for corporate purposes; and (3) that there seems
no doubt that a city empowered to acquire and maintain an airport
within or without the city, and also vested with a general power of
condemnation within or without the city for corporate purposes,
may utilize the power outside the city to acquire an airport.
III. CONTROL AND REGULATION6 5
Local Control:s6
From the outset it has been assumed that certain aspects of
air navigation control lend themselves logically to concentration in
the hands of local authorities. 7  The line of division between the
categories of municipal, state, and federal concern has not been
satisfactorily located. 6 Of course, the supervision of persons and
property at the airport is primarily a local matter, and ground and
approach rules ordinarily are considered as local matters, subject
to standardization by the state. State bodies in turn bow by courtesy
or necessity to federal regulations, and international rules adopted
as part of the federal code.
The advantages of local control in many phases of airport
65. See a general article by Rowland W. Fixel, "The Regulation of Air-
ports," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 483.
66. The sanctional aspects of control have not been treated in this sur-
vey. Punishments may be summarized as (1) direct criminal punishment, a
fine or impisonment; (2) direct civil punishment, as "grounding'; (3) Indirect
civil 'punishment, arising from the evidentiary value in a civil suit for
damages or the violation of a statute or regulation. One importance of the
last is shown In T. A. T. Flying Service, Tnc. v. Adamson, - Ga. App. --
169 S. E. 851 (1933); note, 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 282 (1933) and cases
therein cited.
67. Cf. Brown, Aircraft and the Law (1933), p. 280.
68. Cone, J. Carroll, "The Dividing Line Between Federal and State Pro-
motion of Aeronautics," 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 473 (1933).
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operation is obvious. Local police and administrative officials are
present or easily accessible, local circumstances may necessitate
adaptations unknown to officials farther removed from the scene,
and local legal sanctions can easily be applied. The desirability
of a large measure of local control was recognized by the Air
Commerce Act of 1926, which authorized the transfer of federal
fields to municipalities wherever deemed advisable. 9
The degree of control granted to the municipalities empowered
to construct and maintain airports has varied greatly from state to
state. With the increasing tendency to vest a larger measure of
control in the state aeronautics commission, or the department
vested with the powers ordinarily granted to such a body, has come
a corresponding diminution in the measure of local control which
can be exercised freely.
The scope of power ordinarily granted is well-defined in the
proposed Uniform Airports Act. 71 Power is granted to local bodies
"to adopt regulations and establish charges, fees and tolls for the
use of such airports or landing fields, fix penalties for the violation
of said regulations, and establish liens to enforce payment of said
charges, fees and tolls." In the absence of such specific enabling
legislation, power to enact such reasonable regulations as may be
necessary and incidental to the operation of the airport is inferred
from the grant of legislative authority to establish, maintain, or
operate an airport.7 1
What is the scope of this power? It is limited by two factors:
(1) the inroads upon it in the form of delegation of specific pow-
ers of regulation to state bodies and the Federal government, which
will be discussed later, and (2) the restrictions which have been
placed upon the delegation of legislative power to administrative
bodies. Necessarily, consideration of the latter point is based upon
recognizing the clear distinction between the powers which are to
be exercised by a municipality per se through its local legislative
channels, and the powers which are attempted to be exercised by
an administrative body, independent of some local or state legis-
lative regulatory pattern.
The exercise of the police power by the state or municipality
properly vested with it for the performance of legitimate municipal
functions, comprehends the imposition of all necessary regulations
for the protection of the lives, health, and property, of its citizens
69. Sec. 5, Code Title 49. See Fixel, Rowland W., "The Regulation of
Airports," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 484 (1930).
70. Supra, note 33.
71. Brown v. Clark. 102 Tex. 323, 116 S. W. 360 (1909). See Mr Fixel's
article, supra, note 65, at p. 487.
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and the public morals. Once the public purpose of the airport was
established, the question of direct municipal regulation never arose
as a serious difficulty.
The tendency to vest administrative bodies with broad powers
of regulation gives rise to more weighty considerations, as regards
both state and local administrative agencies. The delegation of
legislative powers to administrative bodies is prohibited; adminis-
trative rulings must be based upon a definitive statement of legis-
lative policy, and an enunciation of the general standards of con-
duct. Indefinite standards vesting arbitrary powers in an adminis-
trative body are incapable of delegating power to supply their
deficiencies.
72
Frequently states have provided that the rules and regulations
made by municipalities shall not be contrary to rules made either
by the state regulatory body, or the Department of Commerce." s
Some legislatures have incorporated into their statutes by reference
the enactments of Congress, and attempted to provide that all
future federal laws shall have the effect of local law. As to the
first procedure, it has been said that most state courts would
support a statute directing a commission to adopt rules in con-
formity with federal regulations, if no new penalties were pre-
scribed by subsequent federal legislation. 74 Two objections have
been raised. The first is the delegation of legislative power of the
state to the federal government, based upon the insufficiency of a
local declaration of sufficiently definite standards. 75  If the local
standard be reasonably complete, that objection is overcome; if it
is not, regulations, conformatory or not, would be invalid. The
second objection is based upon incorporation by reference. In the
absence of constitutional provisions prohibiting the practice, there
seems to be no objection to incorporation of present federal sta-
tutes, but an attempted present incorporation of future changes in
the federal statute may be held to be bad. 76 It was upon this latter
72. See two exhaustive articles by Albert Langeluttig on the broader as-
spects of this field: "Criminal Violations of Administrative Regulations," 2
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 151 (1931), and "Standards in Aviation Legislation," 4
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 29 (1933).
73. This is in keeping with the general rule that administrative bodies
cannot change existing law by regulation. To achieve adaptability of regulation,
statutes should be as broad and general as possible in their regulatory
provisions.
74. See Langeluttig, Albcrt. "Criminal Violations of Administrative Regu-
lations," supra note 72.
75. State constitutions are usually more explicit in their prohibition of
delegated legislative powers than the Federal constitution, but state courts
have been quite liberal in interpreting these provisions. See Langeluttio.
Albert, "Criminal Violations of Administrative Regulations," supra note 72,
at p. 153.
76. See Fagg, Fred D._ Jr., "Incorporating Federal Law Into State Legis-
lation," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 199 (1930). Although this statement of the
rule is found In Black. Constitutional Law (4th Ed. 1927). p. .354, words may
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point that the New Jersey Aviation act was held invalid by the
nisi prius court in State v. Larson.77
The power of protective zoning attempted to be vested in local
authorities by such statutes as that of Indiana, 8 and the proposed
Uniform Airports Act, 79 in general gives power to provide unob-
structed air space for landing and taking-off by the creation of
restricted zones. Combined with the power of eminent domain
over circumjacent territory,80 this would seem to give protection to
the airport and those who use it, as well as protection to the land-
owner whose structures may interfere with the proper and safe
maintenance of the airport."' Excess or partial condemnation has.
been approved in several legislative measures. 8 2  Codrdinate with
these powers is that sometimes granted, to order the removal of
high tension lines and similar dangerous hazards maintained by
public utilities.89  That these powers are largely supplementary is
easily seen; failure to grant one without the other may result in
thwarting the purpose of the whole program. Excess condemna-
tion and zoning arrive at practically the same result by contrary
means. Zoning is protective and preventive; condemnationp is
destructive. Zoning may result in less expense, however. Since the
landowner's rights in superjacent air space are said to extend only
to his "effectively possessed" air space, the exercise of the police
power through the medium of zoning will limit his effective pos-
session, and make possible the use of space above it without
remuneration for trespass.8 4  Condemnation contemplates taking
air rights for public use, and the award of damages. A serious
objection to the use of zoning has been pointed out by Sheldon
be found in the statute to bring the case within the rule enunciated in Com-
monwealth V. Aldermen. 275 Pa. 483 (1923). It was there held that refer-
ence to future legislation by Congress was not a delegation of legislative power,
since it merely designated a "definite source of information or standard."
77. 10 N. J. Misc. 284. 160 A. 556 (1932). Henry Heineman treats the
problem In an excellent comment in 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 456 (1932).
78. Supra, note 34.
79. Supra, note 20.
80. As found in Connecticut Acts of 1929, Ch. 236.
81. Some of the difficulties are pointed out in a comment, 4 Air Law Rev.
166 (1933).
82. Ohio Laws of 1931, No. 601, Sec. 3939; Maine Laws of 1931, Ch. 213,
Sec. 4.
83. Hubbard. McClintock and Williams. op. cit. supra, note 54, at p. 128.
See also an article by Williams, Frank B., "Legal Considerations in Planning
Airports," 155 Annals 43 (Pt. II, 1931). This measure was vigorously urged
in the Report of the Commission on Airport Zoning and Eminent Domain,
2 Air Commerce Bull. 325 (1931).
84. The apparent utility of zoning may be destroyed by the application
of a principle like that enutnciated by Metzenbaum: "When a case or situation
involves an actual 'taking' of property, or a genuine 'deprivation' of a full or
partial interest in property, and when such 'depriving' is for some specific im-
provement or project, the courts have promptly removed the false label of
'Police Power' and have in place thereof affixed the true and appropriate name
of 'Eminent Domain,' thus insuring to the owner, that compensation to which
he may be legally and constitutionally entitled": Law of Zoning, Sec. 48.
See also Brown. op. cit. supra, note 67, p. 286.
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Elliott :s zoning regulations are necessarily impermanent, since they
are based upon the compromise of conflicting rights, which may
change radically in a short time and necessitate a readjustment
less satisfactory to the airport.86
One writer on airport law has attacked the validity of any
zoning ordinance based upon the "gliding angle" formula, which
furnishes the foundation for most of such regulation. He says:
Manifestly any zoning limitation of the height of all structures in the
district a given distance from its (airport's) outer boundaries at an angle
of seven to one or ten to one is impossible; for it is a serious burden on
neighboring land in the interest of the port and does not in any proper
sense treat all similar land in the same district in the same way.8 7
Another pertinent objection has been pointed out to the use
of zoning ordinances: the interest and safety of the public in
using the airport must be shown to be paramount to the right of
the individual landowner to use his land as he sees fit. While
there are pronouncements in zoning statutes and ordinances to the
effect that such enactments are based upon considerations of public
safety, these are not conclusive upon a court.""
There is no doubt that a municipality may be empowered to
exercise its police power outside its corporate limits, in the presence
of enabling legislation.89 A more difficult question, and happily a
rare one, arises when the power of regulation is not specifically
so extended. No case has as yet arisen on this point,90 and in view
of the tendency to codify and clarify state airport legislation, in-
cluding among other additions the power to regulate the extra-
territorial airport empowered to be acquired, the possibility
of such controversy is becoming increasingly slight. Where muni-
cipalities are allowed by the courts to exercise the power of pur-
chase without their limits, in the absence of statute, police power
over the land so acquired would seem to be lacking."" On the
other hand, in the light of the general doctrine that powers neces-
85. Elliott. Sheldon D.. "Unobstructed Airport Approaches," 3 JOURNAL O
AIR LAW 207 (1932).
86. Arthur L. Newman advances the interesting proposition that the doc-
trine of ,way by necessity" might be utilized to protect airport approaches:
"Airports as a Way by Necessity," 1 Air L. Rev. 458 (1930). The impracti-
cability of the suggestion is pointed out by Rohlftng, Charles C., "The Airport
Approach," infra note 88.
87. Frank B. Williams, in Hubbard, McClintock and Williatis, op. cit.
supra, note 54, at p. 127.
88. Rohlflng, Charles C., "The Airport Approach," 4 Air L. Rev. 144
(1933).
89. Silverman v. City of Chattanooga, ... Tenn ... , 57 S. W. (2d) 552(1933); noted in 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 427 (1933) ; Ebrite v. Crawford,
84 Cal. 12. 12 P. (2d) 937 (1932), noted in 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 462 (1932).
90. This problem, however, has been suggested and discussed at an earlier
date. See the remarks of Mr. Vincent Mosely at the First National Legis-
lative Air Conference in 1930. 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 507 (1930).
91. Thompson v. Park Commrs., 44 Mich. 602, 7 N. W. 180 (1880).
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sarily incident to an expressed power will pass by implication, s2
the power of extra-corporate regulation would pass by a statute
authorizing extra-corporate acquisition and maintenance of an
airport.
State Control:
State control of municipal airports, while it is based upon
statutes, which vary widely in their provisions, may be divided
roughly into four categories: (1) control through the initial choice
of site, design and construction; (2) control through the power to
supersede local police regulations with uniform regulations eman-
ating from the state regulatory body; (3) control through licens-
ing, both initial, and renewal, the license being contingent upon
continuing compliance with state requirements, based upon inspec-
tion periodically; and (4) control through the infrequently granted
power to order protective zoning locally, or the removal of ob-
structions. Recent legislation viewed broadly indicates an ever-
increasing tendency to vest in the state regulatory body sufficient
authority to require compliance with uniform standards of rules
and maintenance.9 The propriety and advisability of such a
tendency is unassailable. The ever-increasing volume of travel
makes it essential that travelers be certain that they will not run
afoul of peculiar local regulations, or meet disaster through reliance
upon map markings which do not indicate unusual local conditions.
Some few states set as a prerequisite to the establishment of
a municipal airport, approval of the site and construction plans by
the state regulatory body. Typical of this class are Illinois94 and
Connecticut. 9
A power far more frequently reserved in the state is that of
making supervening regulations for the practical conduct of the
municipal airport. " Seemingly the regulatory power of the muni-
cipality is confined to making those regulations which are purely
supplementary to, and not conflicting with the state regulations.
The advantages of this division are well illustrated by the situation
in Michigan, where a competent Board of Aeronautics, acting under
legislatively granted power of the nature here discussed, has
92. Ogden v. Madison. 111 Wis. 413, 87 N. W. 568 (1901) ; Ex parte Blois,
179 Cal. 294. 176 P. 449 (1919).
93. See Fagg, Fred D., Jr.. "The Minnesota Aeronautics Act," 4 JOURNAL
oF AiR LAW 340 (1933).
94. Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1933) Ch. 15Y .
95. Connecticut Laws of 1929, Ch. 236.
96. Connecticut requires that local regulations be filed with the Commis-
sioner and approved by him, before the airport can be operated.
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adopted a complete, well-considered code of rules for the conduct
of air traffic and airports throughout the state.9 7
Licensing provisions are rapidly finding their way into the
law. They assume the presence of competent, full-time assistants
to the state aeronautics commission, who make periodic inspections
of all airports, make recommendations, and require compliance with
minimum standards. These licensing provisions are of two kinds:
(1) those similar to the Federal licensing program, which merely
grants certificates in the nature of recognitions of merit to those
airports which have voluntarily complied with certain requirements,
but which carry no sanctions for non-compliance, and (2) those
represented by the Michigan provision, which requires a license
from the Michigarn Board of Aeronautics as a prerequisite to
operation. Coupled with the power to make all reasonable rules
and regulations for the conduct of airports, this latter type of
provision practically nullifies any remaining regulatory power in
the municipality. It represents the culmination of considerable
agitation on the part of aeronautical engineers, who foresaw chaos
in an uncobrdinated municipal airport development program.9 8
A fourth type of control, which might possibly be better
termed encouragement, 0 is found in statutes similar to that of
Connecticut."' It is there provided that the Director of Aero-
nautics shall have the right to exercise the power of eminent do-
main, and order the removal of power lines and similar obstructive
hazards, when he deemed it necessary for a municipal airport de-
velopment. Why those powers should not be vested in the muni-
cipality itself is difficult to see. Happily, opposition to more com-
plete grants of power has almost vanished, but vestiges of it are
still apparent in a few instances.
Corollary to state control of municipal airports is active state
participation in financing and management. Not infrequently state
bodies are authorized to follow this course of conduct. The ap-
parent purpose is two-fold: first, to insure a high degree of state
97. 1930 Air Traffic Regulations, 1930 TI. S. Av. R. 403.
98. For an exceedingly thorough plan of state regulation, see Michigan
Laws of 1929. No. 177, and Pennsylvania Laws of 1929, Sec. 316.
99. Promotional activities, and voluntary cooperation of the state with the
municipalities constitute a chapter of airport history not here discussed. See
Cole, Elwood B., "The Illinois Program of Aeronautical Regulation and Pro-
motion," 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 51 (1934) : Langeluttg.q. Albert, and Freedman.
Leo, "Promotion of Aviation by State Regulatory Bodies," 4 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 303 (1933) Wright, Paul A.. "State Aids to Aviation," 4 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 212 (1933) Cone. J. Carroll. "The Dividing Line Between Federal and
State Promotion of Aeronautics," 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 473 (1933); Evans,
Ployd E., "Recent Developments in State Promotion of Aeronautics," 4 JOURNAL
or AIR LAW 504 (193.c) : Landi8s, Reed G.. "The Illinois Plan of Aviation En-
couragement," 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW (1933).
100. Connecticut Public Acts of 1929, Ch. 236.
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control over key airports, and second, to bring about the estab-
lishment of advantageously located ports where the communities
themselves are unwilling or unable to bear the entire burden. While
aside from the purpose of this study, it seems necessary to point
out here that state bodies are in some instances granted the power
to establish airports entirely independent of municipal action, a
power which rounds out the plan of a complete cordinated state
development program. 10 1
Federal Control:
The degree of control which the Federal government can exert
over municipal airports is still very largely a matter of conjecture.
The desirability of enforced uniformity of airport rules ana mark-
ing through the country has been strongly urged in many quarters,'"
but as yet no vigorous direct action has been taken in that
direction. 0 3
Federal legislation and Department of Commerce rules made
in pursuance to it have not attempted to cover the field of local
airports. 1°0  Indeed, by implication, non-federal control of some
type has been impliedly approved by the prohibition upon main-
tenance of commercial airports throughout the country by the
Department of Commerce, 5 and the statutory admonition in the
Air Commerce Act of 1926 to turn over to municipalities com-
mercial airports maintained by the government or any of its
branches, wherever located.10 6
In view of the increasing scope of interstate airlines, and their
use of municipal airports, the interstate commerce power furnishes
the basis for complete regulation of airports where required in the
interest of the protection of that commerce. 07 There is dictum
101. A general discussion of practical application of principles is found
in Cuthell. Chester W.. "The Scope of State Aeronautical Legislation," 1 JOUR-
NAL OF AIR LAW 525 (1930).
102. Two illustrative examples may be selected from a large group:
Young, Clarence M., "The Province of Federal and State Regulation of Aero-
nautics," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 423 (1930). at p. 427; Rentschler, Frederick
B., "Importance of Uniform Aeronautic Regulatory Laws," 2 Air L. Rev. 222
(1931). See also Bogert, George G., "Problems in Aviation Law," 6 Cornell
L. Q. 271 (1921).
103. Davis. W. Jefferson, "The Uniform State Aeronautical Code," 4 Air
L. Rev. 58 (1933).
104. In People v. Katz. 140 Misc. 46. 249 N. Y. S. 719 (1931) the in-
genious defense to a prosecution for violation, of a state air traffic regulation
was that the Federal Air Traffic rules had supplanted state regulation. The
court denied the validity of the defense.
105. Boutelle, Richard S., "State and Federal Cooperation in Aviation
Promotion and Control," 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 459 (1933).
106. Lee, Frederic P., "The Air Commerce Act of 1926," 12 A. B. A.
Jour. 371 (1926).
107. Logan, George B.. "The Interstate 'Burden Theory' as Applied to
Ai Transportation," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 433 (1930): Tuttle, Alonzo H.,
and Bennett. Dale E., "The Extent of the Power of Congress Over Avia-
tion," 5 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 261 (1931).
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in the Neiswonger case1 08 supporting the conclusion that a regulation
of intrastate air travel is valid if in the interest of protecting
interstate commerce. 09 This reasoning is supported by cases in
other fields of commerce. But how far does the same line of ap-
proach apply to control of an airport? It seems indisputable that
an airport is as indispensable to interstate commerce as railroad
lines or terminals are to the conduct of interstate railroad com-
merce. Legal rules of long standing would then support the ex-
tension of Federal power to these instrumentalities, insofar as the
exercise of such power is essential to the protection of interstate
commerce. If the mere act of flight within a state may be con-
sidered as sufficient interference with interstate commerce to merit
regulation by the Federal government, then certainly the mainte-
nance of an airport frequently used as a station in interstate travel
would be so considered. 1 0
In order to determine the fields of primarily local police regu-
lation to which Federal control might extend, regard must be had
for the well-settled rules enunciated in two leading cases concern-
ing the scope of the so-called Federal police power. Within the
territory of a state the Federal government has no general police
power,"' nor can the power to regulate interstate commerce be
exercised as a general police power, supervening the general police
power of the states in the control of their local trade and manu-
facturing. 1 2  Thus any exercise of police power by the Federal
government as an incident to control of interstate commerce, or
under similarly granted powers, as that over navigable waters," 3
must be construed as are all delegated powers, i. e., strictly. But
the rule applied by the United States Supreme Court in resolving
conflicts between residuary state powers and the delegated Federal
power of control over interstate commerce, as applied in many
cases, indicates a liberal view of the grant, and has resulted in
extending Federal control to great lengths. By direct analogy,
rates, tolls, fees, field regulations covering both landing and taking
108. 35 F. (2d) 761 (D. C. Ohio, 1929). See 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
359 (1930).
109. Federal jurisdiction Is treated In a -comment, 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
359 (1930).
110. Writers have frequently predicted wide Federal constitutional control
over intrastate operations: MacCracken, William P., Jr., "Air Law," 57 Am. L.
Rev. 97 (1923) : Green, Rowan A., "Aviation from a Legal Point of View," 15
A. B. A. Jour. 305 (1929) ; Zollmann, Law of the Air (1927). Secs. 48 and ft.
111. V. S. v. DeWitt, 76 U. S. 41 (1869).
112. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1917).
113. Transportation Company v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691 (1882). See
an Interesting discussion of the applicability of this case to Federal control
of airports in Harriman, Edward A.. "Federal and State Jurisdiction With
Referene to Aircraft." 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 299 (1931). The same thought
finds expression in Kintz, E., McD., "The Federal Air Traffic Rules," 1 Air L.
Rev. 265 (1930).
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off, the use of airport facilities, and airport marking, would fall
directly within the scope of Federal power. As to zoning and
removal of obstructions, Mr. Edward A. Harriman in an inter-
esting discussion of the whole problem of Federal control 6f
aeronautics, has pointed out that, although the commerce power is
probably broad enough to support Federal enactments forbidding
the erection of structures which would interfere with commerce
by air, the courts would be reluctant to extend that power without
compensation to the owners, and the exercise of the power must
have a direct relation to the protection of interstate commerce. 14
By indirection, Federal control through regulations Is rapidly
extending throughout the states through the adoption of state leg-
islation which incorporates Federal statutes and rules and the
delegation of the regulatory power to bodies to be exercised only
in accordance with Federal rules."' Statutes like that of Nebraska, '
reach the same end through a variant procedure. It is there
provided that all airports must conform with Department of Com-
merce standards for approved and rated airports."' IBy this means,
standards which were in their inception purely suggestive, and
designed to encourage rather than require, have become regulative
without further action by the Federal government. The difficulties
which inhere in the use of this procedure have been previously
pointed out."18
Another instrumentality of indirect Federal control, frequently
used in other fields, is found in grants and subsidies to local proj-
ects conditional upon conformity with Federal standards. Although
this device has not yet come into extensive use in the aviation field,
it was embodied to some extent in the Aeronautics Branch-CWA
airport program." 9
International Control:
The rapid increase of international air navigation agreements,
in both scope and number, necessitates some consideration of their
effect upon the control and regulation of local airports. Both the
114. Ibid.
115. Minnesota Laws of 1933, Ch. 430; Pennsylvania Laws of 1933, Act.
224.
116, Nebraska Laws of 1929, Ch. 35.
117. Supra, note 1. These optional standards have evidently not been
very successful In raising the standards of airports throughout the country.
118. It seems established that the Federal Air Traffic Rules do not amount
to legislation and are therefore not violative of the prohibition against the
delegation of legislative power. See Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Co., 35 F. (2d) 761 (D. C. Ohio. 1929), dicta in Smith v. New England Air-
craft Co.. 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385 (1930), and the Swetland case in the
District Court, 41 F. (2d) 929 (D. C. Ohio, 1931).
119. Supra, note 2.
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International Convention for Air Navigation, known as the Paris
Convention, and the Pan-American Convention for Commercial
Aviation contain provisions concerning airports. The latter, of
which the United States is a signatory power, provides in Article
XXIII, "The establishment and operation of airdromes shall be
regulated by the legislation of each country, equality of treatment
being observed." Article XXIV provides for uniformity of air-
port charges between local and international aircraft.
The extent to which the Federal government can control local
airports in pursuance of treaty obligations has not yet been satis-
factorily defined, nor has any step been taken in the exercise of
the power. But reasoning from the doctrine of Missouri v. Hol-
land1 20 and subsequent cases which have followed it, it appears
that the Federal government can constitutionally control all avia-
tion in the United States to the extent necessary to assure the
uniform rules and regulations provided in the C6nvention. 12 1
IV. OPERATION.
Once the municipal airport is thrown into the category of
proper municipal enterprises, its operation is governed by the same
principles which govern similar municipal projects, as water plants,
and municipal utilities. There are, however, certain points of dif-
ference which have found places in judicial decisions, and deserve
mention.
In the case of State ex rel. Chandler v. Jackson,"2 2 a landing
field was declared to be a public utility, and as such its construction
by the municipality was approved. It was there also held that
inasmuch as the airport was a public utility, all ordinances con-
cerning it must be passed upon by the people, as provided by state
statute for ordinances concerning other public utilities. While
other restrictions upon operation have not yet found their way
into the cases, it is highly possible that other' local statutory pe-
culiarities of local park and public utility operation may be found
to hamper free operation of the airport.
Indirect operation through lease to a private person, through
an operations contract with an independent operator, or by joint
operation with an aircraft company or an airline, involving joint
contributions, has presented another obstacle to the free exercise
120. 252 U. S. 415 (1920).
121. Cooper, John C., Jr., "The Pan-American Convention on Commercial
Aviation and the Treaty-Making Power," 19 A. B. A. J. 22 (1933). But see
Wigmore, John H.. "Did the 'Federal Government Acquire Exclusive Aerial
Jurisdiction Two Years Ago?" 4 JOURNAL OF AiR LAW 232 (1931).
122. Supra. note 7.
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of discretion in the choice of means to accomplish the most useful
and inexpensive management of the local airport.1 8 State ex rel.
Mitchell v. City of Coffeyville' denied the power of the munici-
pality to lease an airport to a private person for operation, even
though the management thus obtained would be responsible and
desirable, upon the ground that the power to acquire and manage
did not carry with it the power to lease to a private person. 125 In
the absence of express statutory enactment, the power is denied,
This holding is in conformity with the conventional view of the
power to lease municipal facilities to private persons. 12  The
legislature of Kansas immediately enacted the necessary permissive
statute, which was supported and interpreted to support a similar
desirable lease in the case of Concordia Arrow Flying Service
Corp. v. City of Concordia.27  The operations contract is open to
the same attack.
Joint operations with private operators, coupled with joint
contributions, is a practice laden with dangerous possibilities, if
the suggestions of the court in the case of Reinhart v. McGuffie 1 2
are to be taken seriously. In that case there was joint manage-
ment by a county and a private company, and the court sounded
the warning that such agreements would be very carefully scru-
tinized for any evidence of unfair distribution of expense, or sub-
sidy. The length to which such scrutiny might be carried is ex-
emplified in the court's own language:
We did find that the mechanic employed by the [public] board of
management was also privately employed, and payments made for his
services were made to the Aircraft Corporation, and while the amount was
nominal, we condemned the practice and directed its discontinuance.
The McGuffie case illustrates the application which might be
made of the doctrine of extension of public credit for private use,
to a lease or operations agreement. If the terms of the lease pro-
vide for a purely nominal rental, as they well might under present
economic conditions, the public credit argument would undoubtedly
be raised to defeat the indirect subsidy. In reference to this latter
123. Statutes frequently permit the extension of this right: cf. Stern v.
Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City. 8 N. J. Misc. R. 307, 150 A. 9 (1930).
124. 127 Kans. 663, 274 P. 258 (1929).
125. A statute granting this power was upheld and applied in Stern v.
Mayor and Aldermen of Jersey City. supra note 123
126. Palmer v. Albuquerque, 19 N. M. 285, 142 P. 285 (1914). But see
Dillon, Municipal Corporations, op. cit. supra, note 54, at Sec. 997, as to real
estate in general. This rule might as well apply to Improved airport tracts.
"In the case of lands held for public purposes, a city may lease the same for
purposes which' are not inbonsistent with, but germane to and in furtherance
of the public uses for which the lands are held."
127. 131 Kans. 247, 289 P. 955 (1930).
128. Supra. note 9.
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point there is an intimation in the Dysart case 2 9 that the same
considerations which motivated courts to approve municipal sub-
sidies of railroads three-quarters of a century ago might prevail
today to support subsidies to a municipal airport.
V. TAXATION EXEMPTION.
A factor which lends appreciably to the advantage enjoyed by
municipal airports over those privately owned is the exemption
from taxation, frequently found in statutes.' Such exemption is
in the nature of another subsidy in the cause of aviation develop-
ment. Unfortunately it is sometimes provided that in the event
of a lease to a private person the exemption is suspended and the
property returned to the tax rolls. In view of the popular practice
of leasing, it is seen that this provision robs the taxation exemp-
tion of much of its efficacy. Further, it loses sight of the original
exemption, which as an indirect subsidy could be granted to the
donee as well through the medium of the lessee as through the
channel of direct municipal operation.
VI. TORT LIABILITY.
The liability of municipalities for tortious acts occurring in
the course of their management and operation of an airport de-
pends primarily upon whether the airport be considered a govern-
mental or proprietary function.' In the" few cases which have
already arisen upon the point it has been held that the airport
falls within the category of "proprietary functions" by analogy to
electric utilities, waterworks, or docks and wharves. 2 In treating
the defense of "government function" raised in the Lartigue
case' 33 the court rules that the airport was essentially a part of the
city's transportation system, bearing strong analogy to a railway
station or bus terminal, and the work of building and maintaining
streets, which was done in a corporate as distinguished from a
governmental capacity. The profitableness of the function was
held to have no bearing upon its character. It is well settled that
in the pursuance of a proprietary or ministerial function, the lia-
129. Supra. note 9.
130. *Kentucky Laws of 1929, Ch. 77.
131. For a general discussion, see David, Leon T., "Municipal Liability
in Tort in California," 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 269, 7 So. Cal. L. Rev. 48.
132. City of Mobile v. Lartigue, 23 Ala. App. 479, 127 S. 257 (1930)
Coleman v. City, oJ Oakland, 110 Cal. App. 715, 295 P. 59 (1930); Mollencop
V. City of Salem, 139 Ore. 137, 8 P. (2d) 783 (1932).
133. City of Mobile v. Lartigue, supra, note 132, noted in 1 JOURNAL OF
Ame LAW 365 (1930), 34 Law Notes 112 (1930), and 17 Va. L. Rev. 80 (1930).
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bility of the municipality is similar to that of a private person
engaging in the same activity.
Difficulty is encountered in those jurisdictions which term an
airport a proper park function. Parks have been thrown into the
"governmental function" class, with limited liability, in some juris-
dictions, although the decisions are in considerable conflict, and it
would seem to follow that an, airport maintained in a park would
be insulated from ordinary liability. But in the Coleman case'8 4
it was not so held, in spite of the fact that in California airports are
specifically declared to be proper park functions, and parks have
been repeatedly held there to be a "governmental" not a "proprie-
tary" function. The airport in that case was termed a proprietary
function., and full liability was attached.
The significance of the distinction between governmental and
proprietary functions is breaking down in its application to liability
for tort. The historical basis for the extension of immunity has
been nullified, by reason of the "ever-increasing state-wide signifi-
cance of activities formerly conceived*of as purely local in char-
acter."'1 5 As a purely practical matter, the advisability of extend-
ing immunity into fields of governmental activity formerly occupied
exclusively by private enterprise is doubtful. In view of the dimin--
ishing scope of governmental immunity from tort,186 the possibility
of airports receiving the benefit is very slight.
The recognition of the impossibility of limiting municipal lia-
bility under existing judicial rules has suggested two different types
of protection. The first is the enactment of specific immunity
statutes, relieving the municipality of tort liability in the conduct
of their airports. 117 This has been done in several states, but the
doubtful social expediency of such legislation will probably check
its wide-spread adoption.13 8 The other, and more advisable solu-
tion, is that adopted in the rules of the Virginia Corporation Com-
mission, which is given extensive control over municipal airport's.
Airport liability insurance is there required as a prerequisite to
operation.3 " Another solution suggested in a bill introduced
into the New York state legislature, but never passed, would limit
134. Coleman v. City of Oakland, supra, note 132, noted In 2 JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW 436 (1931), and 2 Air L. Rev. 285 (1931).
135. See comment, 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 421 (1930).
136. For a complete analysis of this whole problem, see Borchard, E. M.,
"Governmental Liabilities in Tort," 34 Yale L. Jour. 1 (1921).
137. Iowa Laws of 1929. Ch. 138; Texas Laws of 1929, Ch. 83; Wis-
consin Laws of 1929, Ch. 464.
138. See note in 1 L. R. A. (N. s.) 49 on the effect of such legislation.
139. Administrative Orders of the State Corporation Commission, Sept. 26,1929.
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the liability of airport proprietors to torts arising from "palpable
negligence.'
4 0
Liability for nuisance and trespass is governed by the same
rules of tort liability which govern accidents.' 4 ' Nor is a license
to operate, issuing from the state board of aeronautical control, a
defense to an action of nuisance. Such defense was made in the
case of Gay and the Rush Hospital v. Taylor, et al., and it was
there treated properly with but scant ceremony. 1 2
A mun-icipality which leases its airport to a private person for
management is liable upon the ordinary rules of lessor's liability for
the acts of the leisee. In the Meloy case" s the question was raised
whether liability of the lessor for nuisances in the maintenance of
the airport might not be assessed upon the basis that the airport
purpose contemplated at the time of the leasing was a nuisance
per se. The argument lacks force, and it seems that liability can
not be impressed upon such a foundation. The same result applies
to trespasses by the lessee.
VII. CONCLUSION.
Out of the chaos which of necessity accompanied the rapid
development of this wide-spread but unco6rdinated movement to
establish municipal airports, there is evolving some semblance of
order. The efforts of the proponents of the Proposed Uniform
Airports Act may be seen reflected in recent state legislation rough-
cast in the mould of the Uniform Act, replacing older legislation
of the haphazard era; the persuasive effects of the non-coercive
uniformity program of the Department of Commerce are mirrored
in the administrative codes of the state regulatory bodies. It
seems likely that the near future will see more direct Federal con-
trol impressed upon airports; such a step will only hasten the
inevitable nation-wide co6rdination of avigational facilities.
140. See report, 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 348 (1930).
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